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In important conflicts such as wars and labor-management disputes, people typically rely on the
judgment of experts to predict the decisions that will be made. We compared the accuracy of 106
forecasts by experts and 169 forecasts by novices about eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts
who used their unaided judgment were little better than those of novices. Moreover, neither group's
forecasts were much more accurate than simply guessing. The forecasts of experienced experts were no
more accurate than the forecasts of those with less experience. The experts were nevertheless confident
in the accuracy of their forecasts. Speculating that consideration of the relative frequency of decisions
across similar conflicts might improve accuracy, we obtained 89 sets of frequencies from novices
instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations. Forecasts based on the frequencies were no more
accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the single most likely decision. We conclude that
expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will make in conflicts. When
decision makers ask experts for their opinions, they are likely to overlook other, more useful, approaches.
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In important conflicts such as wars and labor-management disputes, people typically rely on the judgment of
experts to predict the decisions that will be made. We compared the accuracy of 106 forecasts by experts and 169
forecasts by novices about eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts who used their unaided judgment were
little better than those of novices. Moreover, neither group’s forecasts were much more accurate than simply
guessing. The forecasts of experienced experts were no more accurate than the forecasts of those with less
experience. The experts were nevertheless confident in the accuracy of their forecasts. Speculating that
consideration of the relative frequency of decisions across similar conflicts might improve accuracy, we obtained 89
sets of frequencies from novices instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations. Forecasts based on the
frequencies were no more accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the single most likely decision.
We conclude that expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will make in conflicts.
When decision makers ask experts for their opinions, they are likely to overlook other, more useful, approaches.
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A

sking an expert to predict what will happen in
a conflict seems to be a reasonable thing to do.

be made of executives in business, the public sector,
and the armed services.

For example, the media find professors and politicians to tell us what will happen when discussing
conflicts such as the war on terrorism. In business, a
CEO might ask the company’s marketing manager to
predict competitor response to a new-product launch
or ask the human resources manager whether offering a two-percent wage increase will deter a threatened strike. In the military, a general might ask an
intelligence officer if the enemy is likely to defend an
outpost.
Evidence from surveys suggests that forecasts of
decisions in conflicts are typically based on experts’
unaided judgments (Armstrong et al. 1987). Informal
evidence that this is true abounds. Winston Churchill
observed that a politician should have “The ability
to foretell what is going to happen_ _ _ _ And to have
the ability afterwards to explain why it didn’t happen” (Adler 1965, p. 4). The same observation might

While it is attractive to think that if we can find
the right expert we can know what will happen Armstrong (1980), in a review of evidence from diverse
subject areas, was unable to find evidence that expertise, beyond a modest level, improves an expert’s ability to forecast accurately.

Some Beliefs About the Value of
Expertise
What do people think about the value of expertise
when forecasting decisions in conflict situations? Prior
to giving talks about forecasting, we asked attendees
for their opinions on the likely accuracy of experts’
and novices’ (university students’) forecasts of decisions in conflicts. We told respondents that, for the
purpose of our survey, they should assume that those
asked to make predictions had been presented with
1
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descriptions of several different conflicts and were
asked to choose from between three and six possible decisions such that the expected accuracy from
choosing randomly across the full set of conflicts was 28
percent. This percentage is the average chance of a
correct prediction for the eight conflicts we used in
our research, or _1/6 + 1/4 + 1/4 + 1/4 + 1/3 + 1/3 +
1/3 + 1/3_/8 ∗ 100. By asking respondents to adopt
28 percent chance as the value of chance when they
made their assessments, we are able to make
meaningful comparisons between our research findings and their accuracy expectations.
We conducted our surveys prior to giving talks to
academics and students at Lancaster University (19
usable responses), Manchester Business School (18),
Melbourne Business School (6), Royal New Zealand
Police College educators (4), Harvard Business School
alumni (8), conflict management practitioners in
New Zealand (7), and attendees at the International Conference on Organizational Foresight in
Glasgow (15). A copy of our questionnaire is available at www.conflictforecasting.com. We excluded
27 responses from people who expected accuracy to
be less than 28 percent for any method because it
seemed implausible to us that the forecasts of any
method would, on average, be worse than chance. If a
method really were worse than chance, the forecaster
could eliminate the decision predicted by the method
and choose another one at random, thereby obtaining
forecasts that were more accurate than chance.
Our practitioners, forecasting experts, and miscellaneous academics had little faith in the judgment
of novices, expecting their predictions to be accurate only 30 percent of the time—little better than
chance. The respondents had greater confidence in
experts—66 percent expected them to be more accurate than novices, whereas only 9 percent expected
novices to be more accurate. Despite their greater
faith in experts, respondents expected only 45 percent
of experts’ forecasts to be accurate. If the responses
we excluded were included, the average expectations
would be 30 percent for novices and 42 percent for
experts, rather than 30 percent and 45 percent, respectively.
We suggest that accurate prediction is difficult because conflicts tend to be too complex for people
to think through in ways that realistically represent
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their actual progress. Parties in conflict often act and
react many times, and change because of their interactions. In addition, there may be interactions within
each party, and there may be more than two parties
involved.
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) suggested that when
people are faced with complex situations, they are
likely to resort to the heuristic of availability to judge
the likelihood of outcomes. That is, they test their
memories and judge an outcome likely when they can
easily recall or imagine a similar one. For example,
some people tend to think it likely that new wars will
end badly because they have a vivid memory of the
unceremonious withdrawal of US and allied troops
from Vietnam (Kagan 2005). There is, however, ample
reason to be skeptical about whether the availability
heuristic will lead to accurate predictions. For example, salient outcomes and the situations that gave rise
to them are unlikely to be representative. Unstructured reviews of the past are likely to offer poor guidance for the future (Fischhoff 1982, Harvey 2001).
How people process information is problematic. If
we take Bayes’s theorem as the standard, people tend
to adjust their predictions less than they should when
they receive new information (Edwards 1982). When
they consider the likelihood of an outcome from a
multistage process (e.g., Hitler invades Belgium, he
succeeds, Britain declares war, Hitler attacks Britain),
people have the opposite tendency: they act as if their
best guesses of what will happen at early stages are
certainties (Gettys et al. 1982).
Stewart (2001) found that judgmental forecasts are
likely to be unreliable when (1) the task is complex, (2) there is uncertainty about the environment,
(3) information acquisition is subjective, or (4) information processing is subjective. Problems of the type
we are considering are likely to meet Stewart’s four
conditions for unreliability.
It is difficult for people to improve at predicting decisions in conflicts using unaided judgment
because basic conditions for learning are typically
absent. Timely and unambiguous feedback is uncommon, and opportunities for practice are rare (Arkes
2001). Feedback may include misleading information
that an adversary has disseminated or the unreliable
accounts of witnesses. Accurate feedback may be misinterpreted because experts have misunderstood the
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situation (Einhorn 1982). Decision makers may act
to avoid a predicted outcome, thereby confounding
feedback. Conflicts often occur over long periods of
time, and those responsible for predicting an outcome
may no longer be present when the actual outcome
occurs. Many experts rarely face important conflicts.
For those who do, each conflict may be unique.
Experts can readily construct spurious correlations to
support their theories (Chapman and Chapman 1982,
Jennings et al. 1982).
Finally, Tetlock (1999) found that experts have excellent defenses against evidence that their forecasts
were wrong so that even in situations where conditions for learning are good, experts may still fail to
learn.
Robert McNamara (Morris 2003), Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, referred to the “fog of war ” in relation to conflicts in
which he was involved. We suggest that this term,
which appears to have originated in the writings of
Prussian Major General Carl von Clausewitz in 1832
(von Clausewitz 1993), might reasonably be applied
to most conflict situations in which decision makers
use their unaided judgment to make predictions.

Research Method
We recruited domain experts, conflict experts, and
forecasting experts to predict the decisions made in
eight diverse conflicts. The conflicts were real situations for which accurate forecasts might reasonably have been expected to save money or lives.
We disguised conflicts that were not obscure to
make recognition of the real situation unlikely. We
chose conflicts for their diversity and because we
could get good information about them. The conflicts involved nurses striking for pay parity, football players seeking a bigger share of revenues, an
employee resisting the downgrading of her job, artists
demanding public financial support, a novel distribution arrangement that a manufacturer proposed to
retailers, a hostile takeover attempt, a controversial
investment proposal, and nations preparing for war.
Each involved two or more interacting parties. The
materials we used in our research are available on
conflictforecasting.com.
We allocated the conflicts to expert participants
based on their expertise. For example, we sent conflicts
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between employers and employees to industrial-relations specialists, and we sent all eight conflicts to
conflict-management experts. Because we used e-mail
to contact participants, we had no control over how
much time they spent on the task, or whether they
referred to other materials or consulted other people.
We recruited novices to make predictions for the
same situations (Green 2005) and provided them with
the same materials. Rather than sending them the
material by e-mail, we paid the students to make their
predictions while they sat in lecture theatres. We did
not attempt to match students’ knowledge and experience with the subject matter of the conflicts. Unlike
the experts who had discretion over the conflicts for
which they made predictions, the students were paid
only when they had provided forecasts for all of the
conflicts that we had allocated to them.
Obtaining the Forecasts
For each conflict, we provided participants with a set
of between three and six decision options. We gave
them no instructions on how they should make their
predictions.
The way in which a problem is posed often affects
judgmental predictions. One important distinction is
whether a problem is framed as a specific instance
or a class of situations. For example, one might ask,
“How probable is it that the US will sign the Kyoto
Protocol?” Alternatively, one could frame the problem
as, “In what proportion of cases would the US sign a
treaty that would cause certain harm to the nation’s
interests in return for uncertain benefits?” Kahneman
and Tversky (1982a, b) proposed that, whereas people
tend to think of situations as being “singular ” when
they assess the likelihood of outcomes (e.g., Kyoto
Protocol signature), their predictions would be more
accurate if they used a “distributional” approach (e.g.,
international treaty signatures) to assess likelihood.
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) used the term “outside
view” when they presented evidence on the superiority of a distributional approach. Tversky and Koehler
(1994) postulated that the greater accuracy is a result
of peoples’ tendency to consider alternatives in more
detail. They suggested that people are prompted to
think more about different ways that an outcome
might occur when a problem is framed as a class of
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similar situations than when it is framed as a singular
instance. Cosmides and Tooby (1996) found evidence
for the proposition that people have innate mechanisms for storing and manipulating frequency information.
We conducted an experiment to compare the accuracy of unaided judgment forecasts collected using
a singular format with those collected by asking
for frequencies of different decisions across a set of
hypothetical similar situations. We hypothesized that
participants who were asked for frequencies might
provide forecasts that were more accurate than those
who were not.
We paid 52 university students the equivalent of
US$20 to take part in the experiment and allocated
them randomly between the singular and frequencies treatments. Each singular-treatment participant
received a different sequence of four of the eight conflicts that we used in our research; we gave matching
sequences to the frequencies-treatment participants.
We allowed participants approximately 30 minutes to
read the material and answer the questions for each
conflict.
Four participants each claimed to recognize a situation, and we excluded their responses. With the
exception of the following forecasting questions, the
treatments were identical.
Singular treatment question:
How was the standoff between Localville and Expander resolved? (check one or %)
(a) Expander ’s takeover bid failed completely.
(b) Expander purchased Localville’s mobile operation only.
(c) Expander ’s takeover succeeded at, or close to,
their August 14 offer price of $43 per-share.
(d) Expander ’s takeover succeeded at a substantial
premium over the August 14 offer price.
Frequencies treatment question:
Assume that there are 100 situations similar to the
one described. In how many of these situations
would _ _ _
(a) The takeover bid fail completely?
out of 100
(b) The mobile operation alone be purchased?
out of 100
(c) The takeover succeed at, or close to, the offer
price?
out of 100
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(d) The takeover succeed at a substantial premium
over the offer price?
out of 100

Findings
Expert vs. Novice Judgment
Our survey respondents expected experts’ unaidedjudgment forecasts to be substantially more accurate
(45 percent) than those of novices (30 percent). This
expectation was not borne out. The unaided experts’
forecast accuracy averaged only 32 percent across the
conflicts used in our studies, little better than the
average accuracy of 29 percent for novices’ forecasts
(Table 1). Neither group did appreciably better than
chance. These results are consistent with evidence that
Armstrong summarized (1985, pp. 91-96).
We used the permutation test for paired replicates
(Siegel and Castellan 1988) to test the significance
of the differences in accuracy between experts and
chance across the eight conflicts. As a casual inspection of the data in Table 1 suggests, the differences
are quite likely to have arisen by chance (P = 0_30,
one-tail test). The test is 100 percent power-efficient
because it uses all the information (Siegel and Castellan 1988, p. 100).
Expert Experience and Accuracy
Is it possible to identify experts who are more likely
than others to make accurate judgmental forecasts?
One way to assess this is to compare the accuracy of
forecasts by more-experienced experts with the accuracy of less experienced experts.
We asked expert participants to record their years
of experience as “a conflict management specialist.”
Chance

By novices

By experts

Artists protest
Distribution channel
Telco takeover
55% pay plan
Zenith investment
Personal grievance
Water dispute
Nurses dispute

17
33
25
25
33
25
33
33

5 (39)
5 (42)
10 (10)
27 (15)
29 (21)
44 (9)
45 (11)
68 (22)

10 (20)
38 (17)
0 (8)
18 (11)
36 (14)
31 (13)
50 (8)
73 (15)

Averages (unweighted)

2829 (169)

32 (106)

Table 1: We show the percentage accuracy of unaided judgment forecasts
(numbers of forecasts are in parentheses).
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As a check, we also asked some of our novice participants the same question. Their responses were as
expected: 94 percent of the university-student participants who answered the question reported that they
had no experience; the rest claimed one or two years
of such experience.
Common sense expectations did not prove to be
correct. The 57 forecasts of experts with less than
five years experience were more accurate (36 percent)
than the 48 forecasts of experts with more experience
(29 percent).
We also asked our expert participants to rate their
experience with conflicts similar to the one they were
examining using a scale from 0 to 10. Those who considered they had little experience with similar conflicts (they gave themselves ratings of 0 or 1) were as
equally accurate at 34 percent (72 forecasts) as those
who gave themselves higher ratings (32 forecasts).
Expert Confidence and Accuracy
We wondered whether experts’ confidence in their individual forecasts could be used to identify accurate
forecasts. On the other hand, their confidence might
be misplaced when the forecasting problems are difficult. We asked our expert participants:
How likely is it that taking more time would change
your forecast?
{0 = almost no chance _1/100_ _ _ _ 10 =
practically
certain _99/100_} 0-10.
While it is possible that the experts might have reasoned that they were unlikely to change a forecast
given more time because they did not expect their
forecast to be better than guessing, the fact of their
participation and our evidence on accuracy expectations suggests that this was not the case. We interpret
the experts’ responses to this question as a measure of
their confidence in the accuracy of their forecasts. We
compared the accuracy of forecasts in which experts
had high confidence with those in which they had
less confidence. When experts assessed the likelihood
that they would change their forecasts if given more
time as between 0 and 2 out of 10, i.e., no more than
0.2 probability of change, we coded the forecasts as
“high confidence.” All other forecasts we coded as
“low confidence.” Using unweighted averages across
the conflicts, the 68 high-confidence forecasts were less

accurate (at 28 percent) than the 35 low-confidence
forecasts (at 41 percent).
We also compared the confidence that the experts
expressed in their forecasts that turned out to be accurate with their confidence in forecasts that turned
out to be inaccurate. There were six conflicts for
which we had both accurate and inaccurate forecasts and for which there were no half-accurate forecasts (the “distribution channel” conflict offered the
option “c. Either a or b” and we coded the nine such
responses as 0.5). Using unweighted averages across
the six conflicts, we found that the experts assessed
the probability that they would change the 27 accurate forecasts as 0.25, and that they would change the
51 inaccurate forecasts as 0.17, again showing a lack
of relationship between confidence and accuracy.
Frequency Responses and Accuracy
We expected that forecasts would be more accurate
when we asked our participants to estimate the frequencies of outcomes for many similar situations. Our
university-student participants who judged relative
frequencies were no better at identifying the actual
decision than were those who simply chose the decision they thought most likely. Averaged across conflicts, 33 percent of forecasts from both the frequencies
and singular treatments were accurate (Table 2). Further, the accuracy figures for the two groups appear
to follow the same pattern when looking across the
situations—Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient 0.59, P < 0_10 (Siegel and Castellan 1988).
Of the 89 frequencies predictions, 54 percent summed to the total of 100 that was specified in the frequencies-treatment question; 35 percent totaled more
Chance Frequencies Singular

Total

55% pay plan
Artists’ protest
Distribution channel
Personal grievance
Telco takeover
Zenith investment
Water dispute
Nurses’ dispute

25
17
33
25
25
33
33
33

0 (12)
10 (10)
23 (13)
11 (9)
50 (12)
40 (10)
67 (12)
64 (11)

9 (11)
0 (11)
38 (13)
46 (13)
25 (12)
42 (12)
42 (12)
58 (12)

4 (23)
5 (21)
31 (26)
32 (22)
38 (24)
41 (22)
54 (24)
61 (23)

Averages (unweighted)

28

33 (89)

33 (96)

33 (185)

Table 2: We show the percentage accuracy of novices’ frequency and singular forecasts (numbers of forecasts are in parentheses).
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than 100, and 11 percent less than 100. It is arguable
that, despite our intentions, the decision options
we provided were not entirely mutually exclusive
or exhaustive, and the failure of some participants’
responses to add to 100 is not necessarily a failure
of logic on their part. On the other hand, researchers
have found that even with mutually exclusive and
exhaustive lists of events, responses do not consistently sum to 1.0 or 100 percent because people commonly fail to interpret probability or frequency scales
in ways that researchers intend (Windschitl 2002).
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that our
participants, who in most cases had only three or
four decision options to assess, allocated frequencies
that were at least consistent with their ranking of the
options’ likelihoods. For our analysis, therefore, we
used the decision with the highest frequency or probability, or the single decision chosen, as the forecast.
We dropped 10 observations in which there was a tie.
When we excluded responses that did not sum to
1.0 or 100, it did not change our conclusion that asking participants for frequencies did not improve accuracy. Across the conflicts, the average accuracy for
frequencies responses was 29 percent (48 forecasts)
compared with 32 percent (93 forecasts) for singulartreatment responses.
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There are no good grounds for decision makers
to rely on experts’ unaided judgments for forecasting decisions in conflicts. Such reliance discourages
experts and decision makers from investigating alternative approaches (Arkes 2001).
While it is difficult to accurately forecast decisions in conflict situations, we have shown in Green
(2005) and Green and Armstrong (2004) that it is possible to obtain substantially better forecasts. Green
(2005) found that simulated interaction, a type of role
playing for forecasting behavior in conflicts, reduced
error by 47 percent when compared with game-theory
experts’ forecasts. (Role players were mostly undergraduate students.) In Green and Armstrong (2004),
we asked experts to recall and analyze information
on similar situations from the past using a method
we called structured analogies. When experts were able
to think of at least two analogies, forecast error was
reduced by 39 percent compared to chance accuracy.
While expert advisors and political leaders use
unaided judgment to forecast, it is unreasonable to
accuse them of bad faith when their predictions about
conflicts prove wrong. We should expect inaccurate
predictions when experts use unaided judgment to
forecast how people will behave in conflicts.
Acknowledgments
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Comment: Combating Common Sense and Meeting
Practitioner Needs
Shelley A. Kirkpatrick
Homeland Security Institute, 2900 South Quincy Street, Suite 800, Arlington, Virginia 22206, shelley.kirkpatrick@hsi.dhs.gov

G

reen and Armstrong discuss the accuracy of twoforecastingmethods—simulatedinteractionand

structured analogies. This study, in conjunction with
their previous research, provides compelling evidence
that each of these methods yields more accurate fore-

casts than experts’ unaided judgment (Green 2002,
Green and Armstrong 2004).
I am a principal analyst at the Homeland Security Institute (HSI). The views I express in this article are my
ownanddonotnecessarilyreflect HSIopinionorpolicy.
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In my experience as a scientist practitioner who has
worked with the intelligence, defense, and homeland
security (IDHS) communities to assess the behavior
of adversary groups and leaders, I have encountered
many perspectives on expert judgment. To illustrate, I
describe three views.
(1) Experts can address all problems: This is the
view that we can accurately address national and
homeland security issues, including conflict situations, by asking experts. Sometimes, we ask a group
of experts to arrive at a group forecast. Other
times, we seek a range of viewpoints, e.g., to identify new vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. We
seek expertise using many methods, including focus
groups, panel discussions, conferences, meetings, and
informal interactions.
(2) We cannot forecast all problems: Some problems
are undefined or too complex, or we lack expertise
about them. This is related to the view that, because
experts are not always right, we should consult many
experts. When one must consult an expert—such as
when there is little objective data available and small
changes in the environment—it is recommended that
many, rather than few experts be asked to provide a judgment (Armstrong 1985). However, experts
typically do not provide decision makers with quantitative forecasts, thus forcing decision makers to integrate a variety of qualitative viewpoints.
(3) We can model and forecast problems: Rather
than relying on expert judgment, we can use modeling to quantify problems and yield a forecast. Quantitative modeling approaches often assume that the
individuals we model operate with perfect rationality.
For example, research has yielded no evidence that
terrorists are mentally ill. However, rationality from a
terrorist’s perspective usually differs from rationality
as perceived by a US citizen (Sageman 2004). Clearly,
we cannot model all problems. Thomas Schelling,
winner of a Nobel prize in economics for his work
on game theory, states that game theory is less useful for analyzing how to deter terrorists from using
nuclear weapons because “it is difficult to figure out
what their objectives are” (Henderson 2005). Still, it
is possible to apply current forecasting principles to
the problem of terrorism (Green 2004). According to
Heuer (1999), there is no failure to collect intelligence
data, only failure to analyze it.
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I present some ideas on the value of unaided expert
judgment, and then follow with suggestions for future
research to help practitioners develop forecasts.
Combating Common Sense
Examples abound of common-sense ideas that research
does not support. The use of unstructured interviews
to select new employees (Schmidt and Zimmerman
2004) is one illustration. In an unstructured interview,
the interviewer asks different questions of different
applicants or asks the same questions in a different
order. In a structured interview, the interviewer asks
all applicants the same questions, in the same order.
The interviewer usually determines the questions,
which are all intended to determine job-relevant abilities.
Research, including several meta-analyses, on unstructured interviews consistently finds it to be
less accurate than structured interviews (Huffcutt
and Arthur 1994, McDaniel et al. 1994, Wiesner
and Cronshaw 1988) in predicting job performance.
Despite these findings, interviewers commonly use
the unstructured interview for several reasons. First,
managers like unstructured interviews because they
require little or no preparation. Second, managers frequently have already decided that the applicant is
qualified but want to appraise qualities, such as communication skills, that are not always apparent on a
resume. Third, applicants expect unstructured interviews and are familiar with an unstructured format.
Extrapolating from this example, we can find clues
on why relying on expert judgment seems reasonable.
I present these ideas to explain why the findings of
Armstrong and Green appear counterintuitive, not to
argue against their findings:
—Decision makers can engage experts in twoway conversation. Such dialogue enables experts to
explain their forecasts and decision makers to improve their understanding of the problem.
—Experts can determine the decision maker ’s
requirements, making future interactions with the
decision maker more efficient.
—Experts are thought to arrive at forecasts, especially of new problems, quickly. Compared to an empirical study or analytical process, experts simply
arrive at a judgment or decision; they do not go
through an empirical process of designing a study,
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collecting data, performing analyses, and drawing
conclusions. Structured methods require time for data
collection, analysis, interpretation of results, and communication of findings to the decision maker.
—The use of trusted experts enhances the forecast security and secrecy. Structured methods may require the involvement of more people, and results
obtained from software-based forecasting methods
can be copied and stolen. Even knowledge of forecastdata requirements can provide an adversary with information about the forecast.
—It is difficult to question or challenge a forecast
without knowing how the expert arrived at it. Decision makers who prefer an expert approach or trust
the judgment of a particular expert are often unlikely
to ask the expert for an explanation of the judgment.
Indeed, the expert may not be able to explain all of
the factors considered in making the judgment.
It is difficult to convince people that their commonsense ideas are wrong. Rather than trying to do so,
perhaps we should try to give decision makers a better understanding of the real value of unaided expert
judgment. For example, such judgments may be useful in improving the decision maker ’s understanding
of a forecasting situation but not helpful when a specific forecast is required.
Meeting Practitioner Needs
I believe that Green and Armstrong are a positive example of researchers who strive to create
new and useful knowledge for practitioners. Their
websites (www.conflictforecasting.com and www.
forecastingprinciples.com) are excellent resources for
scientists and practitioners. I propose some ideas that
they, and others, might consider for future research.
Their articles and websites provide descriptions of
their methodologies and guidance for applying them.
However, they may still leave practitioners uncertain
on how to use the methodologies in their specific
conflict situations. I encourage Green and Armstrong
to continue to research the implementation of their
methodologies, and thus to facilitate their practical
use. Expanding their research to new problem sets
and new study participants, for example, would be

one way to demonstrate the broader applicability
of their methods. Practitioners could serve as partners in the research process, such as by assisting
in developing conflict situations that have external
validity. I also suggest that they use their websites
as a forum for practitioners and researchers to share
role-playing instructions, new conflict scenarios, and
lessons learned when applying the methodologies.
Finally, many subject-matter experts do not have
training in developing a forecast in a structured manner. Therefore, I suggest a slightly different line of
research to focus on training experts. In addition to
determining ways to obtain accurate forecasts without using experts, finding ways to train subject-matter
experts in forecasting may prove valuable.
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S

adly, the conclusion that Green and Armstrongreach—thatexpertsshouldnotbeusedforpredict-

ing the conflict outcomes—is not a surprise. Decades
ago, Armstrong taught us that expertise beyond a
minimal level does not improve judgmental accuracy across a variety of domains (Armstrong 1980).
More recently, Tetlock (2005) drove home that point
in a study of hundreds of political experts who made
thousands of forecasts over many years. Like Green
and Armstrong, Tetlock found the expert forecasts to
be frequently inaccurate. In support of Armstrong’s
previous work, Tetlock suggests that avid readers of
The New York Times should be able to predict political
events as well as highly trained experts.
Green and Armstrong also demonstrate that nonprofessionals mistakenly expect superior performance
from experts relative to what they expect from
novices. Although it is true that neither novices nor
experts were more accurate than guessing in eight
conflict-prediction tasks, most study participants did
not begin with high expectations of the experts. Participants expected experts to be accurate 45 percent
of the time in tasks in which random guessing would
yield a success rate of approximately 28 percent.
Although these expectations were higher than chance,
they are hardly a high endorsement for the perceived
value of using expert forecasters.
However, if people really believe that experts are
not good at predicting the future, why do we clamor
for their views? Perhaps, we find it comforting to
be with those who are knowledgeable about things
that concern us. By speaking to our concerns, experts
may justify our anxieties. Perhaps, experts help us to
organize problems in our minds by laying out the
advantages and disadvantages of the options we face.
Or, when we ourselves must make decisions, perhaps experts function largely as convenient sources
of blame for decisions that turn out badly (e.g., poor
investment choices).

A question that may be more interesting than why
we clamor for predictions from experts who disappoint is why experts continue to offer their faux
expertise. The answer seems obvious: Experts predict because we ask them and reward them well for
doing so. Fame, influence, and riches are the spoils
of those who answer the media’s incessant calls for
forecasting expertise. However, I suspect that most
experts genuinely believe in their forecasting skills. My
suspicion may seem naïve in the face of consistent
evidence that shows expert forecasters struggle to
outperform novice forecasters and chance. Surely the
experts know the data. They must know their own
dismal records. Or, do they? My hunch is that they
do not think their forecasting records are bad. Quite
the contrary, they may believe that their records are
outstanding.
Psychological research shows that people seek, recall, focus upon, and interpret evidence in ways that
reinforce existing beliefs (Nisbett and Ross 1980).
These cognitive biases reinforce our initial beliefs and
prevent us from having to admit error or concede
intellectual ground. If conflict experts believe that
they are quite good at forecasting the resolution of
certain types of conflicts, they may sustain their faith
in their forecasting skills by remembering their correct calls and misremembering their failures. Or, perhaps, they interpret and encode failures as successes.
World events are complicated, and deciding whether
a political forecast (as opposed to a weather forecast
or a sports-contest forecast) is or is not correct can
be a matter of judgment or wish. Were the experts
and politicians who said that former Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction immediately prior to the start of the 2003 United
States-Iraq war correct? Most people think they were
wrong. Others disagree, noting that Saddam Hussein
did have those weapons at one time, that he used
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them against his own people, and that he had the
desire and means to obtain such weapons again. This
defense is an example of what some philosophers
refer to as a “fallacy of diversion” (Damer 1995), i.e.,
an attempt to maneuver oneself into a more advantageous or less embarrassing intellectual position by
focusing on peripheral matters. This may insulate
forecasters from having to contemplate, let alone concede, error.
Even when experts do concede forecast error, they
may not alter their beliefs about their forecasting skills
because they may find ways to minimize the import
of their errors. As Tetlock (2005) documents in his
study of political forecasters, experts find ways to
avoid conceding error—even when faced with an outcome other than they predicted. Paraphrasing Tetlock’s detailed discussion, common defenses of failed
predictions include: (1) I was just off on timing—
my predictions will eventually be borne out; (2) An
improbable event occurred that changed the outcome;

(3) My reasoning was accurate; and (4) My error was
the lesser of the two errors that one could have made.
Green and Armstrong conclude on an optimistic
note. They cite some of their other research, which
shows that conflict-forecasting errors can be reduced
when forecasters engage in role playing and draw
upon analogies from previous conflicts. Until these
and other decision aids are fully developed and in
the cultural mainstream, we would be wise to bear
in mind the two types of forecasters John Kenneth
Galbraith identified: “Those who don’t know, and
those who don’t know they don’t know.”
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T

he findings that Green and Armstrong report arecompatiblewithmanyfindingsthatIdiscussed

in my recent book, Expert Political Judgment: How
Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Tetlock 2005). Like
Green and Armstrong, I found little support for the
usual hypotheses about factors often believed to influence the accuracy of experts’ predictions. When I
examined approximately 28,000 predictions that 280
experts made on the political and economic futures
of approximately 60 countries, I too found no difference in the accuracy of forecasts from: (1) experts versus dilettantes; (2) those with more experience and
those with less; (3) experts from different disciplines
(e.g., economists, political scientists); (4) those with
access to classified information and those without;

(5) those with prestigious institutional affiliations and
those without; (6) those who had lived for lengthy
periods in the relevant country and those who had
not; (7) those with and without relevant language
skills; (8) those who identified their ideology as liberal versus those who considered themselves to be
conservative; (9) those who classified themselves as
realists (who believe that in world politics, the strong
do what they will and the weak accept what they
must) versus those who classified themselves as institutionalists (who believe that international institutions have some normative force not reducible to
power politics); and (10) those whose temperamental self-identification was boomster-optimist versus
doomster-Malthusian. One of my conclusions was
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that, in a complex, probabilistic world, we reach
the point of diminishing marginal-predictive returns
for knowledge considerably more quickly than most
experts—and most users of expertise—appreciate.
The findings of Green and Armstrong (2004) also
agree with other findings I reported—findings that
do pass conventional levels of statistical significance. Green and Armstrong (2004) found that an
experimental manipulation that encouraged forecasters to use historical analogies in more sophisticated
ways (e.g., a balanced appreciation for key differences and similarities across the range of possible
analogies) did produce significant increases in forecasting accuracy. I did not, however, rely on any
experimental manipulations of cognitive style; rather,
I focused on naturally occurring individual variation
among experts in their styles of reasoning. I measured variation both by a cognitive style scale—
the hedgehog-Fox scale—and by content analysis of
thought protocols that experts generated in support
of their predictions. These considerable differences
in methodology notwithstanding, I too found evidence that experts who use historical analogies in
more flexible and balanced ways (rather than just
focusing on the salient points of similarity between
the current situation and their favorite analogy) provided significantly more accurate forecasts. Experts
who used history predominantly to confirm their
hypotheses made predictions that were too extreme.
For instance, in 1992, it would have helped experts
to be aware that although there were several similarities between North Korea and Romania, there
were also many important differences; these differences were sufficient to lessen the subjective probability that the North Korean leadership would be overthrown similar to how the Romanian leadership had
been a few years earlier. In 2003, it might have helped
to be aware that although there were several similarities between the leadership of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq and the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler, there were
also alternative, less ominous, historical analogies,
including Italy under Mussolini, the Soviet Union
under Stalin, Romania under Ceausescu, Yugoslavia
under Tito, and Egypt under Nasser. Using the alternative analogies would have led one to expect a
leadership in Iraq that was considerably more risk
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averse than does the Nazi analogy. That assessment, in turn, might well influence judgments about
the subjective likelihood that Iraq would serve as a
sponsor for international terrorist strikes against the
United States.
Finally, like Green and Armstrong, I find that even
the good news about factors that promote forecasting accuracy tends to have some negative aspects: It
is hard to raise expert forecasting accuracy appreciably above that possible from simple statistical models.
This is a recurring theme in the psychological literature that has, over the last five decades, pitted clinical
versus actuarial approaches to prediction against each
other (Arkes 2001).
If experts’ predictions are as unimpressive as the
results of Green and Armstrong and of my own work
suggest, why is this fact not more widely appreciated? In politics, one obvious answer is that people
are simply too partisan to notice the prediction failures by the pundits on their side—even though they
very much savor the prediction failures of opposition
pundits. As research on cognitive consistency, performed over several decades, suggests (Abelson et al.
1968), there is some truth to this conjecture.
In closing this commentary, I suggest a more unsettling possibility. Imagine this symbiotic relationship.
Experts have an obvious professional self-interest in
sustaining the widespread impression that they possess special knowledge about the future and should
be frequently consulted. And, as I (1999, 2005) have
reported, experts also have an impressive ability to
redefine relatively inaccurate forecasts as relatively
accurate by invoking belief-system defenses such as
“just off on timing” (be patient, x has not happened yet, but it will), the close-call counterfactual
(be reasonable, x did not happen but it almost did
and would have but for this exogenous shock that no
one could have foreseen), and the “I-made-the-rightmistake” (better to have under- or over-estimated
them than the opposite mistake). However, many
social psychologists have argued, as I have (Tetlock
2005), that people have a deep-rooted need to believe
that they live in a predictable and controllable world,
and reliance on expert judgment helps to sustain this
comforting illusion. Consumers of expertise do not
want to believe that in making important decisions—
such as whether to go to war or to redirect economic
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or trade policy—they could do just as well by relying on simple, extrapolation algorithms or even coin
tosses. Each side needs the other too much to disengage from the relationship merely because it is based
on an illusion.
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